This paper examines proposals for decision making with Dempster-Shafer belief functions from the perspectives of requirements for decision under ignorance and sequential consistency. The focus is on the proposals by Jaffray & Wakker and Giang & Shenoy applied for partially consonant belief functions. We formalize the concept of sequential consistency of an evaluation model and prove results about sequential consistency of Jaffray-Wakker's model and Giang-Shenoy's model under various conditions. We demonstrate that the often neglected assumption about two-stage resolution of uncertainty used in Jaffray-Wakker's model actually disambiguates the foci of a belief function, and therefore, makes it a partially consonant on the extended state space.
Introduction
The belief function theory has the root in Dempster's effort in 1960s to generalize Bayesian statistics [5] and later Shafer's proposal for evidential reasoning [20] . The rich body of accumulated literature encompasses understanding of semantics, computation mechanisms, and wide range of applications of the belief function theory. A major motivation of choosing belief function theory over probability theory to represent uncertainty is the ability to express, in a more faithful manner, whole continuum of information availability: from complete ignorance to partial ignorance to full information.
Uncertainty information is useful to the extent that it helps to make correct decisions. When the uncertainty pertinent to decision is captured by probability, decision making is guided by the established Bayesian decision theory (subjective expected utility -SEU) which ranks alternatives by their expected utility. One of the reason explaining wide acceptance of SEU is its rational properties such as dynamic consistency, consequentialism, and immunity from the Dutch-book argument. In the probabilistic framework, the lack of information (when relevant information fails to entail a probability representation) is compensated by invoking the principle of insufficient reason or variations such as maximum entropy principle. The probability obtained by invoking principles of insufficient reason is indistinguishable from probability based on solid frequency evidence.
Belief function theory can address the issue of lack of information but raises some decision making problems. There are several proposals by Jaffray [12] , Yager [27] , Smets [22] and Giang & Shenoy [10] . The lack of consensus is an impediment for applications in practice as it raises reasonable questions about the choice of decision method in a given situation. This paper aims to provide a comparative analysis of the proposals of decision making with belief functions. The comparison is done from the perspectives of requirements about consistency and rational decision under ignorance.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section is a brief introduction to belief function theory that provides a background for subsequent discussion. Section 3 discusses the issues in decision making. The subsequent section has a review of the proposals for decision making. Section 5 contains a comparison focusing on Jaffray-Wakker's (JW) and Giang-Shenoy's (GS) proposals. Section 6 discusses the assumption of "two-stage resolution of uncertainty" in the JW model. Section 7 briefly discusses Yager's model as well as Smets' TBM model. The final section contains some conclusions.
Dempster-Shafer belief functions
An introduction to the DS belief function theory can be found in [20] . For the sake of self-containedness, we provide a brief review of concepts and notations. Ω is the set of states. Variables are denoted by the capital letters to the end of the alphabet e.g., X, Y, Z. Their instances are denoted by lower case letters. A state is a tuple of instances of all variables. Events, subsets of states, are denoted by capital letters to the start of the alphabet e.g., A, B, C. 
All the forms m, Bel, Pl and Com are equivalent in the sense that given any form the others are completely determined. Bel is sometimes referred to as belief function. However, in our usage, "belief function" is reserved for the body of information that has many incarnations m, Bel, Pl and Com. The choice of a form to work with depends on manipulation convenience. In our case, we use plausibility form largely because of its conditional expression. The combination of two belief functions m 1 , m 2 is realized by Dempster's rule denoted by m 1 ⊗ m 2 . Conditioning is the most important special case of combination when m 2 is an elementary belief function that has a single focus m 2 (B) = 1. In this case the combination m 1 and m 2 is also denoted by more familiar notation m 1 (·|B). In terms of plausibility, conditional belief assumes the form of conditional probability: Pl B (A) =
Pl(A∩B)
Pl (B) for A, B ⊆ Ω. DS belief function theory has many interpretations. Dempster [4] views a belief function as the image of probability distribution on S projected on Ω by a set-valued mapping η : S → 2 Ω . The background space S maybe not known to the DM. A probability function on S with Pr(s i ) = p i and mapping η(s i ) → A i induces a belief function m with foci m(A i ) = p i . Shafer [20] , Smets [21] argue for an interpretation of belief function as representation of evidence without referring to an underlying probability function. This interpretive difference is often the cause of many disagreements found in discussion about DS belief functions, including proposals on decision making.
To represent complete ignorance, belief function theory uses the vacuous belief function m vac (Ω) = 1 (equivalently ∀B ⊂ Ω, m vac (B) = 0). On the other end of the information availability continuum is the situation described by a probability function (including deterministic outcome as a special case). Probability function on Ω is just a belief function whose every focus is a singleton ω ∈ Ω. Between these extremes, the available information allows assigning masses to subsets of Ω. A non-singleton focus may be interpreted as conditional ignorance e.g., m(B) ≥ 0 means that there is evidence pointing toward B as a black box but not anything inside.
Belief function theory provides a well defined framework in which the notion of ambiguity can be discussed. Intuitively, a focus intersecting with both A andĀ is equivocal in terms of support for the event or its negation. We state without proof a proposition that characterizes ambiguity in terms of plausibility function.
Definition 1. Given a belief function, an event
The collection of unambiguous events forms an algebra (denoted by H).
Because of Bel and Pl duality, these properties can be restated in terms of Bel. This theorem, in particular part (e), provides a formal foundation to the intuition of treating the plausibility of unambiguous events as standard probability. Note that our formalization of ambiguity based on belief function is slightly different than the formalization based on the capacity found in economics literature [8] where unambiguous events do not constitute an algebra e.g., the intersection of two unambiguous events may be ambiguous. The difference is due to the fact that while a Bel function is a capacity it is ∞−monotone capacity and the convex capacity is only 2-monotone (for more details see [2] ). A definition of unambiguous events without algebraic structure, e.g., non-closure under intersection, would raise an obvious question about the validity of treating their capacity as probability.
Issues of decision making with belief functions
Suppose there is a decision maker (DM) or an agent whose knowledge about possible states of the world is encoded by a belief function and who is concerned with choosing an action among available alternatives. An act is a mapping Ω → O from the set of states Ω to the set of outcomes O = [0, 1]. Two acts f, g are equivalent if ∀s ∈ Ω, f (s) = g(s). Outcomes are measured in risk-adjusted utility rather than monetary unit. This assumption is designed to bypass the issue of risk attitude and to focus on the issues due to ambiguity. The question how to incorporate risk attitude will be addressed in the last section.
Besides the mapping notation, an act is also recorded in rule form as a set of rules {A i ֒→x i } k i=1 which means "if event A i is true then the DM gets outcome x i ". Chain rule E 1 ֒→E 2 ֒→. . . E k ֒→x means "if A 1 and A 2 and . . . A k then x". This chain rule is equivalent to the rule ∧ k i=1 A i ֒→x. Acts are denoted by lower case letters d, f, h etc. The set of acts is denoted by F. For a fixed measure of uncertainty over Ω, the DM's preference over acts is denoted by which is assumed to be a weak order i.e. is reflexive, complete and transitive. The symmetric part ∼ and asymmetric part ≻ of are defined in the usual manner. The restriction of on O is denoted by symbol ≥. Two issues to be discussed in this section are the requirements of rational behavior under ignorance and dynamic consistency. In the subsequent sections, we will ask how different proposals for decision making with belief function fare against those requirements.
Decision under complete ignorance
As noted in section 2, an advantage of belief function over probability is its ability to express various extents of information availability or lack thereof. For m(A) > 0, an accepted interpretation is that the available information (evidence) points toward A but not any of its proper subset. In other words, after conditioning on A, m(.|A) has no information about the realization of states in A (assuming no other focus intersects with A). This reasoning is basis for the proposal by Jaffray and Wakker [12, 13, 23] .
Decision under ignorance has been discussed by Maskin [16] , Cohen & Jaffray [3] and more recently Puppe & Schlag [18] and Larbi et al [14] . The ground-breaking result in this area was made in early 1950s by Hurwicz & Arrow [1] . Intuitively, due to the lack of information about the realization of a possible state, an act is identified with its set of outcomes. The basic construct is a choice operator (ˆ) that for each set of available acts D (is also referred to as decision problem) returns a subset of optimal actsD ⊆ D. Arrow and Hurwicz postulated four rational properties that the choice operator must satisfy.
The non-empty intersection of a decision problem and the choice set of a larger decision problem is the choice set of the former.
Property B. Relabeling actions and states does not change the optimal status of actions. Formally, if there is one-to-one mapping ℓ a : D 1 → D 2 and one-to-one mapping ℓ s :
Deletion of a duplicate state does not change the optimality status of actions. Formally,
Arrow and Hurwicz shown that under "regularity" assumptions, a necessary and sufficient condition for choice operator to satisfy properties A − D is that (1) there is a weak order in the space of ordered pairs
}. This classic result shows that under complete ignorance, only extreme consequences need to be taken into account by rational decision maker. In [14] , the authors show that this conclusion holds even when acts are viewed as sets of consequences (not as mappings from states to consequences). ArrowHurwicz's result specifies a family of utility functions including max, min and linear combinations of minimal and maximal values.
Sequential consistency
The intuitive idea of dynamic consistency can be seen in the law of iterated expectation. Given a probability measure Pr on Ω, an act d : Ω → O is identified with a random variable V on O defined by ∀x ∈ O, Pr(V = x) = Pr(d −1 (x)). In the SEU model, act d is ranked by its expected utility E[V ] (recall that outcomes are measured by risk-adjusted utility). By the law of iterated expectation,
where E is another random variable.
is the expected utility of V if E = e i . Proposition E = e i can be interpreted factually (updating) or counterfactually (planning). To illustrate the point let us consider the following scenario. Example 1. An investor considers an investment instrument d whose return, measured as risk-adjusted utility, depends on two binary variables X (a labor statistics report) and Y (the outcome of a political event of an obscure tribe). d(s 00 ) = 0, d(s 01 ) = 0.3, d(s 10 ) = 0.3 and d(s 11 ) = 1 where s ij denotes the state X = i and Y = j. The labor statistics report is due tomorrow while the political meeting will be concluded in two days. The information about X and Y that investor possesses is denoted I XY whose nature is left unspecified.
Our investor reasons that both X and Y will be resolved in two days. From today point of view, she has a gamble that has three possible outcomes depending on which among four states will be realized.
On the other hand, she can also reason that the next day the labor statistics report will be released. In case X = 0, the instrument becomes d X=0 that has outcomes {0, 0. Dynamic consistency property that requires the equality of the valuations of d and d ′ in the above example, is important for two reasons. Pragmatically, as the law of iterated expectation, it is basis for important techniques such as the divide-and-conquer strategy for planning and folding-back computation. Conceptually, it is a rationality statement about, in McClennen's words [17] , "consistency between planned choice and actual choice". It can also be viewed as statement about decision maker's information processing efficiency.
1 In this paper, we use sequential consistency in a sense similar to the formulation by Sarin and Wakker [19] . We formalize this notion.
is a partition of Ω and Pl is a plausibility function on Ω, the restriction of Pl on H is a function Pl H : 2 H → [0, 1] defined on the algebra formed from the elements of partition H such that for
The restriction is the result of "coarsening" the frame of reference from Ω to H. To show that function Pl H is indeed a plausibility function on the new frame, it is enough to note that the mass assigned to B is transferred to a focus on the new frame: ∪ i∈I B A i where I B = {i|A i ∩ B = ∅}.
It is a standard practice to model preference over acts by a utility function. To discuss sequential consistency we need to make uncertainty factor explicit. Let P be the set of plausibility functions on Ω and F -the set of acts on the same domain. Functional M : P × F → O is called an evaluation model. An evaluation takes as input a belief function Pl and an act f and outputs a value in O. For a fixed Pl, M(Pl, .) is essentially a utility function. Preference relation is said to be represented by evaluation model
. M is also referred to as the certainty equivalence operator because the value M(Pl, f ) ∈ O represents the certainty equivalence of f under Pl.
Definition 5. Suppose Pl is a plausibility function and H
where Pl H is the restriction of Pl on H; 
under the restriction of Pl on H. This decomposition is computationally beneficial as it reduces the complexity. In dynamical settings, after learning A i is true, the DM can simply evaluate
Approaches to decision with belief functions

Jaffray-Wakker approach
Jaffray [12] proposed an approach to decision making with DempsterShafer belief functions which was further developed in a collaboration with Wakker [13] . Essentially, Jaffray's approach is the result of combining Savage's sure-thing principle applied for unambiguous events with the idea of decision under complete ignorance.
Given bpa m on Ω, each act
Instead of considering a preference relation on acts, one can examine a preference relation on belief functions. Suppose B is the set of belief functions on O. Consider a preference relation on
, is also in B. Jaffray assumed that satisfies three conditions. J1 (Weak order) is complete and transitive; J2 (Independence) if f, g, h ∈ B, f ≻ g and 0 < λ < 1 then λf
By von Neumann and Morgenstern theorem, it follows that is represented by a linear utility function 
In [13] , the representation in eq. 4 is arrived by adopting a weakened version of Savage's sure-thing principle. Namely, two pairs of acts (
′ for all s ∈Ā; and (ii)
The weak sure-thing principle requires the unambiguity of the common-outcome sets.
To determine the utility of elementary belief functions v JW (e B ) the requirements of decision under ignorance comes into play because e B has no information about any subset of B. For this purpose, an additional condition J4 (Dominance) is assumed: e B 1 e B 2 if ⊥ B 1 ≥ ⊥ B 2 and ⊤ B 1 ≥ ⊤ B 2 where ⊥ B i and ⊤ B i denote the minimal and the maximal elements in B i respectively. Clearly, the dominance condition is equivalent to Arrow-Hurwicz's properties A through D (section 3.1). With the assumption of Dominance, it follows that v JW (e B ) is a function of the top and the bottom values in B while the form of that function is not given. A most convenient form that fits the requirement is a linear combination which is also known under the name Hurwicz α criterion.
where 0 ≤ α B ≤ 1 is a constant that depends on the values ⊥ B and ⊤ B only. Hence the utility expression of a general belief function is
Wakker [24] notes "[Jaffray's models] achieve a tractability and a separation between risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and ambiguity beliefs that have not yet been obtained in other models popular today". The separation of the factors involved in decision making is clear. The ambiguity attitude is accounted for by α B . The ambiguity belief is represented by values m f (B). In eq. 6, the risk attitude is not visible because in our presentation the outcomes are measured by risk-adjusted utility (section 3). If such an assumption was not made, the risk attitude would be represented by a function u applied for outcomes ⊥ B , ⊤ B . However, the tractability of this model remains an issue. As Hurwicz index α B depends on ⊥ B and ⊤ B , the total number is about a half of the square of the number of outcomes. This requirement makes the approach impractical for problems with many possible outcomes, in particular for a real interval as we assume in this paper. Parametrization of the Hurwicz index function is a viable remedy, in particular, to assume α is a constant that is unique for a decision maker and does not depend on B.
Giang-Shenoy's approach
In [10] , Giang and Shenoy propose a decision model for partially consonant belief functions or pcb. The fundamental importance of pcb is due to Walley's result [25] that pcb is the only class of DS belief functions that is consistent with the likelihood principle of statistics.
Definition 6. A belief function is called partially consonant if its foci can be divided into non-overlapping groups and within each group, they are telescopically nested e.g.,
We can assume without loss of information that ∪ i A i0 = Ω as a state that does not belong to any focus can be ignored. This class includes both probability and possibility functions as special cases. Note that algebra A formed from partition {A 10 , A 20 . . . A m0 } is the algebra of unambiguous events and conditional plausibility Pl A 0i (·) is a possibility function.
Definition 7. Given a set S, a possibility function is a function
A pcb can be decomposed into a probability function on A:
. This approach to decision making with pcb combines the ideas of decision with probability and decision with possibility.
Definition 8. Given a pcb in definition 6, for act
.
Note important facts (1) d and d ′ are equivalent i.e., ∀s ∈ Ω, d(s) = d ′ (s); and (2) given a pcb, the pcb form of any act is uniquely determined. Therefore, instead of directly evaluating an act one can evaluate its pcb form.
Since Pl(A i0 ) are probability and Pl A i0 (B ik ) are possibility, the first stage of d ′ is a probabilistic act and the second stage has possibilistic acts. In a folding-back process, possibilistic acts are evaluated and their certainty equivalences are plugged into the probabilistic lottery which, in its turn, is evaluated by expected utility. Set
According to a decision theory proposed in [9] , possibilistic acts are evaluated by utility function t : F π → Ψ where F π is the set of possibilistic functions on O and Ψ is the set of pairs defined below.
An order ≫ on Ψ, a component-wise operation cmax on pairs and the product of a scalar and a pair are defined as follows
The utility of a possibilistic act {B ij ֒→ w j } k j=1 with π ij = Pl A 0i (B ij ) and t(w j ) = λ j , ρ j is calculated by formula
For continuous t, one can define "inverse" function t −1 : Ψ → [0, 1] by:
This definition uphold familiar cancellations: t(t −1 ( λ, ρ )) = λ, ρ and t −1 (t(w)) = w. The utility function for pcb lotteries [10] has the form 
Comparative analysis of decision models for belief functions
We have seen two ways of evaluating decisions under uncertainty described by DS belief functions. Jaffray-Wakker's model is developed for the general case while Giang-Shenoy's model in [10] is for an important class of partially consonant belief function. It is interesting to understand their difference. The logic of our inquiry is simple. We want to see if the JW model is equivalent to the GS model when the belief function is pcb, in particular how do they fare against the requirements of decision under ignorance and consistency. For clarity, term JW-utility is used for the utility function v given in (6) and GS-utility for function u given in (13) . Several cases will be analyzed. The case of unambiguous partition is considered in section 5.1 where both JW-model and GS-model are shown to be consistent. Sections 5.2 (belief is ignorance) and 5.3 (belief is a possibility function) are devoted for ambiguous partitions where JW-model and GS-model behave differently. The latter is consistent while the former is not. Finally, we formulate in section 5.4 sufficient conditions for consistency on decision trees.
The case of unambiguous partition
We will show that for unambiguous partitions, both JW-and GS-utilities are consistent wrt any unambiguous partition.
Theorem 2. Suppose Pl is a pcb, both Jaffray-Wakker's and Giang-Shenoy's evaluation models are consistent wrt any unambiguous partition.
In a sense, this result is not surprising. The primary object in Jaffray's theory is the mixture of acts. The main formula (eq. 4) is derived from the satisfaction of Independence (J2) and Continuity (J3) axioms on mixtures. But the mixture λf + (1 − λ)g can be obtained from act {head ֒→ f, tail ֒→ g} where {head, tail} is the unambiguous partition of variable Coin with Pr(head) = λ. The case of ambiguous partition is more interesting and will be considered in next two subsections.
The case of ignorance
The obvious and the simplest case to look into is decision under ignorance i.e., elementary belief functions on O which have only one focus. Suppose e B is such a belief function with a single focus B and m e B (B) = 1. Technically, e B is a belief function on O. Before using GS-utility, it is necessary to specify a map from Ω to O and a belief function Pl that induce e B . An act d B such that d B (A) = B and an elementary belief function on Ω, m(A) = 1 will suffice. Denote by 
Clearly, u(d B ) depends on ⊥ B and ⊤ B only. Although (5) and (14) look different, they agree in ignoring intermediate outcomes. Referring to section 3.1, we see that both JW-utility and GS-utility pass a rationality test for decision under ignorance, namely, Arrow-Hurwicz's properties A to D.
On the surface, a difference between the two approaches is that while in (5) belief function does not enter explicitly, it does so in (14) as the result of vacuous belief function Pl(A i ) = 1. In other words, the JW approach treats decision under ignorance as a singular case while in the GS approach, it is just an ordinary case applied for the vacuous belief function.
A more substantial difference is uncovered under a close examination of the consistency requirement under ignorance. Example 2. Consider the investment problem described in example 1. In addition, it is assumed that our investor is ignorant about both variables, all she knows is d According to Jaffray-Wakker's model, since d has outcomes {0, 0.3, 1}. With Hurwicz pessimism index α, the certainty equivalence is (1 − α).
On the other hand, she can also reason as follows. The next day when the labor statistics report will be released, if X = 0 the instrument has outcomes {0, 0.3}, if X = 1 the outcomes are {0.3, 1}. In each case, she remains ignorant because knowing X does not inform anyhow about Y . Hence, the certainty equivalence is 0.3(1 − α) if X = 0 and (1 − 0.7α) if X = 1. From today position, she faces a decision that ends either with 0.3(1 − α) or (1 − 0.7α) depending on the labor statistics report which she is ignorant about. Using Hurwicz criterion, the certainty equivalence is 0.3(1−α)α+(1−α)(1− 0.7α) = (1 − α)(1 − 0.4α). Except α ∈ {0, 1}, this value is strictly less than the ce value of d calculated directly. What is wrong?
According to Giang-Shenoy's model, she evaluates the investment instrument by eq. 14. Suppose that t(0) = 0, 1 , t(0.3) = 0.7, 1 , t(0.4) = 1, 1 and t(1) = 1, 0 , u(d) = t −1 (cmax( 0, 1 , 0.7, 1 , 0, 1 )) = 0.4. She can evaluate the instrument conditional on X = 0 which is u(d X=0 ) = t −1 (cmax( 0, 1 , 0.7, 1 )) = t −1 ( 0.7, 1 ) = 0.3 and on X = 1, u(d X=1 ) = t −1 (cmax( 0, 7, 1 , 1, 0 )) = t −1 ( 1, 1 ) = 0.4. And finally, for a decision d ′ that ends up with either
. In this example, investor's Hurwicz index is assumed to be invariant that is more restricted than the description found in the original paper [12] where such index is allowed to be sensitive to the outcome ranges. Setting aside the impracticality of constructing such a function for a large outcome set, the example indicates a deeper problem which will be explored. The question is how to find a function α(·, ·) that is immune to the described inconsistency?
For a moment, let us step back from belief function notation and denote the state of lack of information or ignorance by IG. An important characteristic of ignorance is invariance wrt the change of the frame of reference. It seems reasonable to argue that changing the reference frame, at least coarsening, by itself does not create any new information that can alter the knowledge status from ignorance into something other than that. The same argument can be used wrt conditionalization. Suppose that you start with ignorance on Ω and learn "A ⊂ Ω is true", then conditionalization on A should produce ignorance on A because the information "A ⊂ Ω is true" has been used to exclude the states outside A and this information does not render anything regarding the states inside A. Walley [26] proposes a similar representation invariance principle (RIP) to capture the intuitive notion of ignorance according to which "the posterior upper and lower probabilities assigned to an observable event A should not depend on the sample space Q in which A and the previous observations are represented". It is easy to show that the vacuous belief function satisfies this assumption. For belief function f with m f (Ω) = 1, (1) ∀A ⊂ Ω, the conditional belief function f A has A as the single focus; and (2) for any partition H of Ω, f H is again vacuous. It is also interesting to note that no probability function would satisfy this assumption. Specifically, because of additivity, changing the frame of reference (e.g., coarsening) will turn a uniform distribution into a non-uniform distribution.
Assumption 1 (Invariance of ignorance). Suppose IG Ω is the ignorance on Ω and H
After insistence that decision under ignorance is nothing but decision with vacuous belief functions, the next logical step is to require the satisfaction of consistency. For that purpose, we rewrite equation (3) to
where
is a partition of Ω. By Arrow-Hurwicz's theorem M(IG Ω , f ) must be a function of two extreme values min(f (Ω)) and max(f (Ω)) i.e.,
M(IG
In addition to (16), γ must satisfy two properties ∀x ∈ [0, 1], γ(x, x) = x and γ(x, y) ≥ γ(x ′ , y ′ ) if x ≥ x ′ and y ≥ y ′ . The former property or unanimity is a natural requirement in the case of certainty about act's outcome i.e., its set of consequences is a singleton. The latter is the dominance condition of Arrow-Hurwicz's theorem. The characterization of function γ is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let ∆ = {(x, y)|0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1} -the set of ordered pairs of numbers in the unit interval. Function γ : ∆ → [0, 1] is continuous on each argument and satisfies three conditions:
iff there exists a value a ∈ [0, 1] for which
We prove a simple lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose γ satisfies properties (i), (ii) and (iii). If
Having characterized an evaluation function that satisfies consistency in addition to the properties A through D, we return to the discussion of JWand GS-utility functions.
In example 2, it has been shown that if the Hurwicz index is a constant the Jaffray model is not consistent under ignorance. A unanswered question is whether allowing α to be dependent on the extreme outcome values as described in the original paper [12] could make Jaffray model consistent under ignorance?
Theorem 3 provides a clear answer to this question. v JW is consistent under ignorance iff v JW (e [x,y] ) has the form of eq. 18.
Set x = 0, y = 1, γ(0, 1) = a = (1 − α(0, 1)), hence, α(0, 1) = 1 − a where a is the constant in eq. 18. Using eqs. 18 and 19, solve for α(x, y) yields
Technically, one can use eq. 20 to argue that if α is allowed to depend on outcome ranges, Hurwicz criterion is compatible with consistency. But the equation renders the interpretation of α as decision maker's pessimism index or uncertainty attitude unconvincing. We believe that an appropriate conclusion is that the Hurwicz criterion, a linear combination of extreme values, is not a suitable way to evaluate acts under ignorance.
Corollary 1. (i) v(e B ) given in (5) satisfies unanimity and dominance but does not satisfy decomposability in theorem 3 unless
given in (14) satisfies all three conditions in theorem 3: unanimity, dominance and decomposability.
By the proof of part (ii), note that GS-utility function u and the real function (18) look very different but are identical in terms of behavior. Also the critical value a in theorem 3 gets useful interpretation a = t −1 ( 1, 1 ) i.e., a is the certainty equivalence of a "fair" possibilistic lottery that delivers 1 and 0 with the same possibility. According to equation (18), (a) if all the outcomes in B are less preferable to the fair lottery then GS-utility evaluate e B equivalent to the best element of B; (b) on the other hand, if all the outcomes in B are more preferable to the fair lottery then GS-utility evaluate e B to the worst element of B; and (c) if B has elements on both sides of the fair lottery then e B is equivalent to the fair lottery. It is interesting to note that the behavior in case (a) is consistent with the "optimistic" while (b) to the "pessimistic" modes of possibilistic decision described in [6] .
In the case of complete ignorance while both JW-and GS-utilities satisfy Arrow-Hurwicz's properties A through D, JW-utility is not consistent while GS-utility is.
The case of possibility function
Example 3. Ω is constructed from two variables X, Y whose domains have two values X = {x 1 , x 2 } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 } i.e., Ω = {x 1 y 1 , x 1 y 2 , x 2 y 1 , x 2 y 2 }. Suppose belief function m on Ω has 3 nested foci (possibility function):
focus Ω x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 1 , x 2 y 2 x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 1 mass 0. 
Let us now consider the second stage lotteries. In order to do that, we compute two conditional belief functions obtained from m by conditioning on X = x 1 and X = x 2 respectively. 3 It is described in the following table.
Foci Ω Denote the conditionals on X = x i by m x i . We have m x 1 ({x 1 y 1 , x 1 y 2 }) = 0.3 and m x 1 ({x 1 y 1 }) = 0.7; m x 2 ({x 2 y 1 , x 2 y 2 }) = 0.5 and m x 2 ({x 2 y 1 }) = 0.5. m x i induce belief function on O denoted by f i . We have m f 1 ({0, 1}) = 0.3, m f 1 ({1}) = 0.7, m f 2 ({0, 1}) = 0.5 and m f 2 ({1}) = 0.5. Calculating JWutility for those lotteries yields v(f 1 ) = 0.3(1 − α) + 0.7 = 1 − 0.3α and v(f 2 ) = 0.5(1 − α) + 0.5 = 1 − 0.5α. Now let us consider the first stage of the decision that is if X = x 1 then the outcome is w 1 = 1 − 0.3α and if X = x 2 then the outcome is w 2 = 1−0.5α. The restriction of the original belief function on partition H = {{x 1 y 1 , x 1 y 1 }, {x 2 y 1 , x 2 y 1 }} is vacuous belief function. So the induced belief function on O is e {w 1 ,w 2 } whose JW-utility is v(e {w 1 ,w 2 } ) = α w 1 + (1 − α)w 2 v(e {w 1 ,w 2 } ) = 1 − 0.5α + 0.2α
The difference between (21) and (22) indicates that JW-utility is not consistent, therefore, the folding-back procedure can not be applied.
Now we turn to GS-utility. Let us compute for d. Assume t(1) = 1, 0 and t(0) = 0, 1 . Conditional plausibilities given x 1 and x 2 are:
( 1, 0.5 ). For the first stage, because Pl(X = x 1 ) = 1 and Pl(X = x 2 ) = 1, under Pl
Clearly, Pl({x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 1 }) = 1 and Pl({x 1 y 2 , x 2 y 2 }) = 0.5 and therefore
Comparing (23) and (24), we see that for GS-utility one-stage and two-stage views are equivalent, hence, it is consistent.
Theorem 4. Suppose Pl is a possibility function and H is an arbitrary partition, Giang-Shenoy's evaluation model is consistent wrt H.
In the case of possibility function, JW-utility is not consistent while GSutility is so wrt any partition of Ω.
Sequential consistency and decision trees
In this section, we combine the results of theorems 2 and 4 to examine the consistency when acts represented by trees. The familiar fold-back procedure starts from the leaves of a tree and works iteratively backward to the root. In each step, a parent node of leaves is evaluated. The evaluated value is used to label the node and then all branches emanating from it are removed. 
Corollary 2. Under pcb given in definition 6 (i) M GS is sequentially consistent wrt tree f if there is a cut consisted of nodes labeled with minimally unambiguous events (ref. to definition 1). (ii) M JW is sequentially consistent wrt tree f if there is a cut consisted of nodes labeled with minimally unambiguous events such that each of the nodes is a parent of the leaf nodes.
Before proceeding with proof, note that the difference between (i) and (ii) is illustrated in fig. 1 . On the left, for M GS , the minimally unambiguous cut is allowed to be in anywhere while on the right, for M JW , the cut must be in the last stage i.e., consists of the parents of the leaves. The result for the JW model is similar to the results of Sarin & Wakker [19] and Eichberger et al. [7] for Schmeidler's Choquet expected utility model of decision under ambiguity. 
General belief functions vs. pcb in Dempster's interpretation
We have seen the comparison of Jaffray-Wakker's approach and GiangShenoy's approach in the case of pcb where both are applicable. However, one may argue that as the former can be used for general belief functions while the latter only for the pcb class, the failure of consistency in certain situations is the price to pay for some gain in generality. We'll argue that is not the case. There are two related-but-different issues in play here: decision under ignorance and decision under ambiguity.
The inconsistency in the JW approach under ignorance and possibility function is traced back to the choice of Hurwicz's criterion for elementary belief functions, v JW (e B ) in eq. (5). This choice is made independently of the "weak sure-thing principle" and "mixture continuity" requirements. So, an immediate solution to the problem is to replace the formula to evaluate an act under ignorance from v JW (e B ) by u(d B ) in (14) .
This solution still satisfies the weak sure-thing principle and mixture continuity and moreover, satisfies consistency under ignorance. This formula does not depend on the "topology" of A 1 and A 2 i.e., whether they are separate, overlapping or nested. In Giang-Shenoy's approach, however, the solution depends on that topology. In the case of overlap i.e., A 1 ∩ A 2 = ∅, A 1 \ A 2 = ∅ and A 2 \ A 1 = ∅, it is not applicable theoretically. In the case of separation i.e.,
In the case when foci are nested e.g., A 1 ⊃ A 2 (hence B 1 ⊇ B 2 ) one has a possibility function with Pl(A 1 ) = 0.4 and Pl(A 2 ) = 1 In their model, Jaffray and Wakker [13, 23] bypass the issue of ambiguity by assuming the "two-stage resolution of uncertainty" based on Dempster's interpretation of belief function [4] as the result of a probability function transformed by a multiple-value mapping. We argue that this assumption, in effect, disambiguates the foci of a belief function and therefore converts it into a pcb on an extended state space.
Suppose K is a set of codebooks and Pr is a probability function on K that tells the probability of a codebook is being used. A set-value mapping κ : K → 2 Ω tells us for each codebook the set of messages it can produce. The probability Pr(z) for z ∈ K is transferred to A = κ(z) ⊆ Ω. This creates a belief function with the foci of the form A = κ(z) which is assigned mass calculated by {Pr(w)|κ(w) = A}.
Normally, given a belief function, it is implicitly assumed that only the message level (Ω) is known. In the two-stage resolution model, in addition, K and mapping κ are also known. For example, suppose a receiver gets message s ∈ κ(z 1 ) ∩ κ(z 2 ) that can be produced by both codebooks z 1 and z 2 . Under normal circumstance, this is the only information it knows. However, under the two-stage uncertainty resolution, the receiver also knows which of the codebooks is actually used. This is called disambiguation.
Let us extend Ω to the product space K × Ω in which we define a belief function m to represent our information. The mass Pr(z) will be assigned to the set z·κ(z) i.e., m(z·κ(z)) → Pr(z). Clearly, these foci are non-overlapping. The obtained belief function is a special pcb. This pcb is decomposed into a probability function Pr (on the algebra formed from {z · κ(z)|z ∈ K}) and conditional ignorance i.e., vacuous belief function.
Generally, in the product space, we can consider richer acts whose outcome not only depend on state in Ω but also on K i.e., δ : K × Ω → O. Any conventional act d : Ω → O can be mapped to an extended act δ as follows: ∀z ∈ K, ∀s ∈ Ω, δ(z · s) → d(s). And for δ, GS-utility (13) can be used.
where A i are the foci of the belief function on Ω induced by Pr and κ. Two remarks are in order. First, (32) is identical to the new version of JW utility (25) which differs from Jaffray-Wakker's formula (6) only by the evaluation of acts under ignorance. Second, all the references to K and κ in (29) disappear in (32). The absence of reference to K and and κ can create an impression that such information does not matter and (6) or (32) can be used for an arbitrary belief function. This conclusion is a fallacy 4 because, as we have seen, the information about K and κ is used to disambiguate the foci and thus makes the difference in the ways masses/plausibilities are employed in utility formula e.g., the difference between (27) and (28).
In sum, the users who apply Jaffray-Wakker's model for arbitrary belief functions often neglect the subtle assumption about "two-stage resolution of uncertainty" on which the model is justified. In doing so, they ignore the effects of ambiguity in decision making. If the assumption holds, an arbitrary belief function on Ω is equivalent to a pcb in the extended space K × Ω. The GS model for this pcb yields an expression similar to JW-utility.
Other models of decision making with belief functions
We have compared Jaffray-Wakker's model and Giang-Shenoy's model. In literature, there are others models, most notably are those proposed by Yager [27] and Smets & Kennes [22] .
According to Yager's method, for belief function f on O with foci
Yager's formula is remarkably similar to (4) except that v Y (e B ) is computed according to the ordered weighted average (OWA) method. Suppose B = {w 1 , . . . w k } and its elements are arranged in a decreasing order i.e., 1 − α, c k = α) . The weights that are determined by a linear programming procedure can vary depending on the size of B. Not only a weight set has to be determined for each subset size, it is not clear how this procedure is justified from axiomatic perspective. Without going into details, note that, except three special cases mentioned above, v Y (e B ) accounts for non-extreme values in B, hence, OWA does not satisfy ArrowHurwicz's postulates for decision under ignorance [1] or consistency.
Smets and Kennes [22, 21] describe an approach called the transferable belief model (TBM) in which "beliefs can be held at two levels: (1) a credal level where beliefs are entertained and quantified by belief functions, (2) a pignistic level where belief can be used to make decisions and are quantified by probability functions." Given a belief function with foci
, probability function Pr b defined by dividing the mass of each focus evenly on its elements:
The expected utility of act d wrt Pr b
It can be seen that (35) is a special case of (33) when all the weights c i are equal. As such, TBM model also does not satisfy the requirements of decision under ignorance and consistency. It can be argued that in this approach, the problem of decision under ignorance does not even exist because the notions of ignorance and ambiguity are meaningful in the "credal level" only. They cease to exist when it comes to decision. Like Jaffray-Wakker's model, Yager's and TBM models do not account for the topology of foci of belief functions, hence, ignore the effect of ambiguity in decision making.
Conclusion
This paper examines the proposals for decision making with DempsterShafer belief functions from the perspectives of sequential consistency and rational decision under ignorance.
We formalize the concept of sequential consistency and analyze the behavior of Jaffray-Wakker's model and Giang-Shenoy's model when belief function is partially consonant. We have shown that (i) both the JW model and the GS model are sequentially consistent wrt any unambiguous partition (theorem 2); (ii) If belief is consonant (a possibility function), the GS model is sequentially consistent wrt any partition but the JW model is not (theorem 4). We identify sufficient conditions for the evaluation of decision trees by folding-back in each model (corollary 2).
We prove the necessary and sufficient condition for decision under ignorance to be sequentially consistent (theorem 3). We conclude that Hurwicz's α−criterion is not compatible with the sequential consistency property.
Finally, we refute the claim that the JW model is more general than the GS model because the former is applicable for general belief functions while the latter only for partially consonant ones. Contrary to common perception, we show that the assumption of two-stage resolution of uncertainty in the JW model actually disambiguates the foci of a belief function. Neglecting this assumption is equivalent to assuming away the ambiguity in belief. Under two-stage assumption, any general belief function can be represented by a pcb in the extended state space, hence the GS-model is applicable. Pl(A i0 ) t −1 (cmax j {Pl A i0 (E ij )t(w j )})
where E ij = A i0 ∩ f −1 (w j ) -the intersection of the pre-image of w j and A i0 . Consider conditional Pl B k . It is again a pcb with foci A ij where i ∈ I k and the conditional mass is
because
Because H is an unambiguous partition, Pl H is probability.
The equality of (41) and (46) shows that M GS is sequentially consistent wrt H.
(Lemma 2) By property (iii), for x ≤ y ≤ 1, γ(x, 1) = γ(γ(x, y), γ(y, 1)). Set y = x and using property (i), we have a = γ(x, 1) = γ(γ(x, x), γ(x, 1)) = γ(x, a). Set y = 1, a = γ(x, 1) = γ(γ(x, 1), γ(1, 1)) = γ(a, 1). It follows from property (ii) that for any y in the interval [x, a], a = γ(x, a) ≤ γ(y, 1) ≤ γ(a, 1) = a.
(Theorem 3) (⇐) It is necessary to show that the function γ given by (18) is continuous on each argument and satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii). For a fixed value x 0 , γ(x 0 , y) is continuous on y. In the case x 0 ≤ a and if x 0 ≤ b ≤ a lim y→b γ(x 0 , y) = b = γ(x 0 , b). If b ≥ a, lim y→b γ(x 0 , y) = a = γ(x 0 , b). In the case x 0 ≥ a, lim y→b γ(x 0 , y) = x 0 = γ(x 0 , b). Similarly, it can be shown that γ(x, y 0 ) is continuous on x for any fixed y 0 . The verification of the unanimity and the dominance is straightforward. Now we have to show the decomposability (17) . In the first case, if z ≤ a then γ(x, z) = z, γ(x, y) = y and γ(y, z) = z hence = t −1 ( max(λ x , λ y ), max(ρ x , ρ y ) ) = t −1 ( λ y , 1 ) = t −1 (t(y)) = y
In case 2, assume a ≤ x ≤ y, it follows that t(y) ≫ t(x) ≫ a. So λ y ≥ λ x ≥ 1 and ρ y ≤ ρ x ≤ 1. So, λ y = λ x = 1.
u(x, y) = t −1 ( max(λ x , λ y ), max(ρ x , ρ y ) ) = t −1 ( 1, ρ x ) = t −1 (t(x)) = x
In case 3, assume x ≤ a ≤ y, we have λ x ≤ 1 = λ y and ρ x = 1 ≥ ρ y u(x, y) = t −1 ( max(λ x , λ y ), max(ρ x , ρ y ) ) = t −1 ( 1, 1 ) = t −1 (t(a)) = a 52) is due to the fact that since {B j } K j=1 is a partition of Ω, ∪ j (C i ∩ B j ) = C i and
